Twentieth Century Chronicle

Page 193

For an island nation that has long lived on an earthquake-prone area, a sense of crisis has always accompanied every Japanese person. For the Japanese, a strong group can at least ensure their survival, while a weak group will only make them prey. The influence of Han culture in Japan was built on the Battle of Baekgang and the Imjin War. When Japan realized that Han culture was insufficient to protect itself, the Japanese began to truly distance themselves from Han culture.

Japanese elites like Shigeru Yoshida, who studied Chinese classics from a young age, were very familiar with Chinese cultural allusions. He started school at the age of four and entered the Koyo Gijuku at the age of eleven, mainly studying Chinese classics and the history of China and Western European countries. However, after the Sino-Japanese War, he began to study Western culture comprehensively and eventually accepted British law and diplomatic methods.

He lacked the traditional Japanese literati's sense of spiritual homeland towards China. Instead, he viewed China as the last fertile land closest to Japan that had not been occupied by foreign powers, and believed that Japan, in its ambition to become a great power, had to devour this land. The Sinology he had studied since childhood was seen by him as a key to unlocking the hearts of the Chinese people and a tool for conquering China; he had absolutely no cultural resonance with the Han Chinese.

His brief diplomatic experience in Northeast China reinforced Yoshida Shigeru's impression that the Han Chinese were incapable of governing the country. Although the Chinese were capable of some business and quite experienced in agriculture, they were completely ignorant of the governance of modern states and the norms of the international community. These Chinese were still living in the Middle Ages.

Shigeru Yoshida even published an article arguing that the Chinese don't understand public affairs and have little to no public morality. He claimed that the Chinese view the country as the emperor's personal property, so the rise and fall of the nation is the emperor's private affair and has nothing to do with the people. Similarly, he argued that the Chinese only care about their own family affairs and are indifferent to the affairs of others, thus there is little public affairs in China, and therefore, the development of Western-style urban self-governing organizations is impossible.

Although Chinese gentry may undertake some public affairs such as disaster relief and flood control, their true purpose is to maintain local order and avoid disturbing their own lives. Moreover, since the land is almost entirely in the hands of the gentry, so-called flood control is actually a way for them to seek personal gain, and it can hardly be considered a public affair.

Yoshida Shigeru concluded: China's population exceeds that of India, reaching 400 million, making it one of the world's most populous countries. However, these 400 million people are nothing more than 400 million selfish individuals. They will not sacrifice their own interests for the benefit of others. They fear power yet love power. As long as they are given even a little bit of power, their first thought is not to benefit the public, but to benefit themselves.

Therefore, 400 million people were nothing more than 400 million scattered sands, which is why the Manchus could rule China with less than a million people. This is precisely where the backwardness of Han culture lies. Since the Manchus were able to rule China as a backward but united small ethnic group, Japan could naturally enter and rule China with its advanced national system.

Yoshida Shigeru even joked: "Manchus often say that the vast territory of China today was all conquered by the Manchus. The Ming Dynasty only had eighteen provinces in the interior, and the rest of the country was a dowry brought to China by the Manchus. So wouldn't it be even more justifiable for our great Japanese Empire to conquer Asia and then rule China? If the British were to become the emperor of China, the honor of the British Empire would naturally be the honor of China. It can be seen that the Chinese are easily conquered because Han culture is a culture in which the conquered flatter the conquerors."

However, after arriving in Wuhan, Yoshida Shigeru's impression of the Chinese as ignorant and selfish, which he had formed in Northeast China, was completely shattered. Wuhan was a new city, and this newness referred not only to the city's construction but also to the core of its urban culture.

In China, there are actually quite a few Westernized cities. Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin were among the earliest port cities to open to foreign trade, and they were also places where foreign powers constantly demonstrated their strength. Among them, Shanghai's concessions were not only established early, but their development speed also far exceeded that of other port cities.

In 1845, 1848 and 1849, Britain, the United States and France respectively established concessions in Shanghai. In 1863, the British and American concessions were merged into the International Settlement. After that, the concessions continued to expand. By 1908, the area of ​​the Shanghai concessions had exceeded the area of ​​Shanghai County.

The British spared no effort in managing the Shanghai International Settlement. Nanjing Road and the Bund, as the core of the Settlement, were filled with Western-style buildings. The British also established Western-style urban public works within the Settlement. If one ignores the slums outside the Settlement, then the Shanghai International Settlement was indeed the most outstanding modern urban district in the Far East. In terms of architectural style and modern urban public services, it was no less impressive than major European cities.

However, if the slums outside the concessions are also considered part of Shanghai, then Shanghai is no different from Calcutta. The gentlemen live in the White District, while the lower classes live in the Black District on the outskirts of the city. The opulence and cheap, attentive service of the White District are built on the exploitation of cheap labor on the outskirts of the city.

Therefore, you can't see much of the Chinese in Shanghai. This city is a foreign city that serves white colonists. All the best things in the city belong to white people. The image of Chinese people in this city is only that of rickshaw pullers, street vendors, prostitutes, coolies, and drug addicts. You won't see a gentleman who conforms to traditional Chinese culture living here because the masters of this city are not Chinese.

While Shanghai was prosperous, it only instilled fear in the Japanese. They called it the "Demon City," believing that white people had swallowed up the Chinese at the bottom of the city, making them the foundation for its continuous expansion. In contrast, although Tokyo was called a large village, at least Tokyo still belonged to the Japanese.

Wuhan also boasts many Western-style buildings, with the Germans providing significant support in the city's development. In fact, Germany itself is a newly industrialized nation that has only recently begun urbanization; Berlin is a prime example of a relatively new city. Therefore, the German design and construction in Wuhan, primarily in Hankou and Hanyang, drew heavily on the experience gained from Berlin's development.

However, the Germans wouldn't call this city Germany's Wuhan, because the city's inhabitants were Chinese; they were merely commissioned to design its urban development. Although the Germans very much wanted to turn Wuhan into German territory like Shanghai, even willing to exchange it for the lease of Jiaozhou Bay, they ultimately couldn't suppress the workers', peasants', and soldiers' government in Wuhan, and therefore couldn't establish a public concession within Wuhan like the British had.

What shocked Shigeru Yoshida was this: in other parts of China, foreigners were privileged individuals who were not bound by Chinese law. Although this caused many conflicts, Chinese officials themselves were a privileged class. The conflict between Chinese and foreigners lay in whether foreigners were also not bound by law like officials, rather than the fact that no privilege should exist. Many Sino-foreign conflicts were confrontations between the gentry and foreigners. The conflicts between foreigners and ordinary people were mainly about missionary work, not about foreigners' privileges.

Chinese commoners acknowledged that officials had privileges, but foreigners, who weren't officials, shouldn't have privileges either. Therefore, when an ordinary foreigner acquired official privileges, it severely damaged the common people's perception, because they realized for the first time that privileges weren't the privileges of the gentry, but the privileges of robbers. As long as one could defeat the imperial court, even commoners could obtain privileges. This shattered their previous blind obedience to the feudal system.

From another perspective, the Boxer Rebellion was a rejection of the feudal class system by the common people; the Boxers attempted to gain the same privileges as foreigners through force. However, the Eight-Nation Alliance suppressed the Boxer Rebellion by force, which forced the people of the north to acknowledge that foreigners did indeed enjoy the same privileges as officials because they possessed considerable power.

This is the kind of Chinese society that Shigeru Yoshida saw in Northeast China. Not to mention that white people could enjoy privileges in Northeast China, even Japanese people were hardly subject to the law. Ordinary Chinese people adopted a submissive attitude towards any foreigner. It is unimaginable that just a few years ago, these same ordinary Chinese people were trying to drive all foreigners out of China.

In Wuhan, not only Japanese people, but even white people could not refuse police questioning and inspection. Wuhan was also a city where Japanese ronin had disappeared. Even if ronin came to this city, they would put up a sign of a legitimate job, otherwise it would be difficult for them to gain a foothold here.

In Yoshida Shigeru's eyes, the police system here is no different from that in Tokyo, and is even more rigorous, because the police in Tokyo do not seek help from citizens, while in Wuhan, the relationship between the police and citizens is much more harmonious. When arresting thieves, citizens often help the police.

In any emerging city, a large homeless population is inevitable. Some come from other places to make a living, while others are forced to live on the streets after losing their jobs. These homeless people form the bottom layer of a large city, thus becoming its dark side. Whether it's Tokyo or Osaka, there are large homeless populations. Yoshida Shigeru was not surprised to see people begging and robbing on the streets of Wuhan; this is a social problem that inevitably arises during urban development.

To his surprise, citizens were willing to risk retaliation from criminal gangs to help the police, a rare phenomenon in both Tokyo and China. On the one hand, the police represent the government and are the frontline personnel responsible for controlling the public. The public's impression of the police is generally not good, especially in China, where most police officers are uneducated, and some are even protectors of gangs. People avoid the police like the plague, let alone help them catch thieves.

The trust that Wuhan citizens placed in the police deeply impressed him. Yoshida Shigeru believes this reflects the public's perception of the government as one of their own, something impossible in traditional Chinese culture, where the antagonism between officials and the people is central. From this perspective alone, Wuhan is a city that defies the standards of traditional Chinese culture.

Like Shengjing and Yingkou, Wuhan is a newly established city, and you can hardly see any elderly people on its streets. However, unlike the cities in the Northeast, the clothing of Wuhan residents is much more common, with cotton fabrics being the main material, and very few people wearing traditional silk gowns.

In the cities of Northeast China, social classes were easily distinguishable by their clothing. The lower classes were practically naked, the middle class wore simple robes, and high-ranking officials and nobles wore silk and fur coats. This did not even mention that officials were always escorted by yamen runners, and ordinary wealthy people were always accompanied by a group of servants; otherwise, it would be difficult to prove their identity and protect their safety.

However, in Wuhan, the commonplace attire masked the differences between social classes. Even government officials wore suits and rode bicycles, and it was rare to see large guards escorting them on patrol. Yoshida Shigeru felt this change deeply, because in the past, during the Edo period, daimyo processions were grand and imposing, but after the Meiji Restoration, these daimyo processions became laughable.

The changes in the clothing of Wuhan citizens and the travel patterns of officials have essentially demonstrated that this regime is moving towards modern civilization. Shigeru Yoshida previously believed that the Chinese could not do this because traditional Chinese culture limited them, but what he saw and heard in Wuhan shattered his impression of the Chinese as inflexible.

In fact, the reforms in Wuhan were more radical than those of the Meiji Restoration government. Because the Meiji Restoration government retained the imperial system, although it abolished the privileges of the samurai, it still acknowledged the existence and necessity of a social hierarchy. Under the emperor, all people were equal; but as long as one person was above the rest, there would inevitably be a group of people who wanted to rise above them.

The Wuhan government, as a workers', peasants', and soldiers' regime, did not recognize the emperor's divine authority and believed that the Manchus' successful entry into the Central Plains was a reactionary consequence of the monarchical autocracy. Because the Ming emperor himself could not save the country, nor did he allow the common people to save themselves, the Han people ended up as slaves of the Manchus.

Under this radical critique of the monarchical autocracy, the old social hierarchy and ethical principles were deemed reactionary ideologies, and the Chinese concept of equality for all was considered more egalitarian than the Japanese idea of ​​a egalitarian society. The consequence was the rapid development of Wuhan, with the construction of a third bridge across the Han River and the steady progress of the Yangtze River bridge.

Just by looking at the spirit of the people of Wuhan, and imagining 4 million people being mobilized by the idea of ​​equality to build like the people of Wuhan, it would be a terrifying nightmare for Japan or other countries. At this moment, Shigeru Yoshida began to feel that the ignorant and submissive Chinese in the Northeast were actually more like the Chinese, and that the Chinese in Wuhan were obviously too superstitious about Western civilization.

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Yoshida Shigeru's apprehension towards the Chinese in Wuhan did not stem from fleeting glimpses of them on the streets, but rather from the profound experience he gained in negotiations with them, where he deeply felt how difficult these Chinese, who had abandoned their traditional culture, could be to deal with.

As the son-in-law of Makino Nobuaki, a top student at Imperial University, and a promising young talent favored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yoshida Shigeru came to China on a private vacation, but it was not for personal business.

His purpose in coming to Wuhan was twofold: first, to conduct private contact with the Wuhan government on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assess the possibility of peaceful coexistence with Japan; and second, to meet with the representative of the Indian Committee stationed in Wuhan to discuss cooperation among Japan, China, and India in combating colonialism. His second purpose was to observe Hayashi Nobuyoshi's influence in China on behalf of his father-in-law, Makino, in order to determine how to handle the cooperative relationship with Hayashi Nobuyoshi.

In terms of official business, Yoshida Shigeru, based on his experience dealing with Chinese officials in the Tohoku region, pointed out that the most critical issue was that Chinese officials had no authority to consult with them. In fact, the corruption of the Chinese government was no different from that of the shogunate during the Black Ships period. Those who were in charge had no power, and those who had power were unwilling to do anything. As a result, those who were in charge either took personal risks and assumed responsibility by acting first and reporting later, or simply acted as mouthpieces, doing whatever they were told to do and not doing anything if they were not told to do something.

This tactic of Chinese officials to stall and delay initially troubled the great powers, because Europe at this time had already established authorized diplomats to handle international relations, and they had not dealt with medieval monarchies in the East for a long time. For European countries, there were actually only three Eastern countries worth sending diplomats to handle diplomatic affairs with: the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire, and China.

These three countries are all large and powerful nations, not small countries that can be intimidated by a few armed sailing ships. When dealing with insignificant small countries, European countries generally do not send dedicated diplomatic officials, but let the fleet commanders decide how to handle the situation, which is essentially a way of colonizing the other side.

Over the past 200 years, the Mughal Empire was destroyed by the British through diplomatic and military means, and the Ottoman Empire, under combined pressure from Europe, accepted the European treaty system and established diplomatic personnel to deal with European countries. Only in the far East, even in 1840, when the Industrial Revolution had just been completed, the British were unable to organize a large army to establish a stronghold city similar to Calcutta in China.

Therefore, the Europeans, who had gained the upper hand in the war, pragmatically regarded China as an independent state similar to the Ottoman Empire. They only demanded that Chinese officials recognize the validity of the treaties they had signed, without considering the country as an object to be colonized. The Europeans hoped to transform the Chinese Empire into a second Ottoman Empire through peaceful commercial and cultural invasion.

However, the Europeans' idea was quickly thwarted. Unlike the Ottoman Empire's culture of admiring strength, the Ottomans, defeated by European military forces, quickly admitted that their culture was inferior to European civilization and began to learn from Europe. As a result, the various governors of the Ottoman Empire declared independence, and the empire disintegrated from within.

However, the defeats in the two Opium Wars in China did not lead the Chinese to admire European culture. Even while the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was fiercely fighting against the Qing Dynasty, it advocated equal relations with Europeans and refused to acknowledge that European civilization was more advanced than traditional Chinese culture. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, the governors-general of various regions in China, even if they showed interest in Western technology, did not aim to use it to achieve independence. Instead, they hoped to use it for technological transformation across the entire country. This was a unified culture that was completely different from that of the Ottoman Empire.

After the First Sino-Japanese War, the weakness of the Manchu Qing dynasty as a small ethnic group facing a large country was exposed. In order to maintain its rule over China, it even signed the overly harsh Treaty of Shimonoseki, which made the great powers lose their fear of this Eastern country. This led to the invasion of China by the Eight-Nation Alliance, which abandoned the peaceful means of dismantling China's monarchical system and instead used force to compel the Manchu regime in China to obey its orders.

The diplomatic tactics that Japanese diplomats learned from the great powers in their dealings with China were based on a combination of force and pressure. They didn't need to negotiate with Chinese officials; instead, they would tell them how the Empire would punish China if its demands were not met. Generally, Chinese officials, fearing escalation, would make concessions, thus minimizing the problem and eventually making it disappear.

Therefore, Shigeru Yoshida was not afraid to negotiate with Chinese officials; what he worried about was that the Chinese officials would refuse to meet with him, thus rendering his threats ineffective. However, in Wuhan, these young Chinese officials were not afraid of threats of force and believed that cooperation was based on mutual benefit, and there were absolutely no cooperation agreements that would result in unilateral losses.

The diplomatic skills that Shigeru Yoshida learned in the Tohoku region were completely useless in front of these people in Wuhan. On his way to Wuhan, he saw the completion of the fortresses and batteries in Hukou and Madang districts. These two fortresses and batteries, built on both sides of the Yangtze River, completely blocked the Yangtze River waterway, making it impossible for warships of various countries to attack Wuhan via the Yangtze River.

In fact, even the British gave up their right to navigate into the waterways above Jiujiang. Just one or two years ago, the British were still unwilling to relent on restoring the right to navigate the Yangtze River. In negotiations with Wuhan, they debated this issue many times, but never received any concessions from Wuhan.

Shigeru Yoshida believes that the construction of the fortified batteries in Hukou and Madang was a crucial factor in the British ultimately abandoning this demand. After all, the British themselves admitted that their warships could not engage these two batteries equipped with German cannons in direct combat on the Yangtze River. Having lost the possibility of threatening Wuhan militarily, the British had to consider the impact of strained relations with Wuhan on their interests in China.

The Germans were the first to relinquish their navigation rights on the middle and upper reaches of the Yangtze River. After all, Germany's shipping rights on the Yangtze were primarily a privilege afforded to powerful nations, yielding almost no economic benefits. The Yangtze shipping industry was mainly divided among British, Japanese, and Chinese domestic powers, making it extremely difficult for the Germans to compete with these three for their shipping interests on the Yangtze.

The Germans, who voluntarily relinquished these privileges, reaped the largest share of the profits during the early stages of Wuhan's development. The biggest problem German banks and companies faced in China in the past was that they arrived too late; traditionally profitable industries were almost entirely monopolized by the British. Germany also had to contend with competition from rising stars like Japan and the United States. Japan and China, leveraging cultural ties, were able to sell their inferior, overpriced industrial products, while the United States continuously expanded its influence through the students it trained in China. Germany didn't actually have much of an advantage in China; although everyone considered German goods to be the finest, they were also the most expensive.

However, after receiving support from the Wuhan government, German companies established a real production base in Wuhan, and the previously expensive German industrial products began to drop in price. In the past, Germany imported relatively little from China, so China had to pay Germany a lot of cash, which actually hindered the growth of trade between China and Germany.

The cooperation between Wuhan and Germany enabled Germany to utilize China's cheap labor and resources. Germany's imports from China began to rise steadily, and its colonies in the Pacific also experienced rapid development. The German mark became the most important foreign exchange reserve of the Wuhan regime. A large number of German marks were not sent to Berlin to be exchanged for gold, but were instead converted into orders for German industry, which led to the expansion of Germany's industrial capacity and monetary credit.

In 1902, Wuhan's total imports from Germany amounted to 6000 million marks, while its exports to Germany totaled 2000 million marks. By 1907, Wuhan's total imports from Germany had reached 1.5 million marks, and its exports to Germany had reached 1 million marks. In 1907, Germany's exports to all its overseas colonies were less than 4000 million marks. China had become Germany's most important trading partner outside of Europe and the United States, followed by Japan and other countries.

The rapid expansion of German industrial goods in China naturally came at the cost of stagnant Sino-British trade. Although trade between Wuhan and Germany was largely driven by new markets created by Wuhan's industrialization, the cash Wuhan used to pay for German industrial goods actually represented a portion of Britain's trade with China.

Trade between Britain and China gradually took shape after China's development following the Opium Wars. The most important trade was in tea and cotton cloth, followed by machinery and arms. After the British established tea plantations in India, the tea trade between Britain and China began to decline. However, Britain, having mastered advanced textile technology, greatly increased its imports of cotton cloth and yarn into China. The cotton used in British cloth came from the United States, India, and Egypt. This meant that the traditional trade pattern between Britain and China had changed. Previously, China exported tea to Britain in exchange for cash and industrial goods such as cotton yarn; now, Britain exported cotton yarn and cloth to China and received cash from China.

This shift in trade patterns brought rural China into the global trade network established by the British, transforming it into a source of raw materials for exporting grains and other agricultural products. The importance of Yangtze River shipping control to British commerce lay in the fact that the Yangtze was the most vital transportation route to central China's agricultural region; controlling Yangtze shipping control was tantamount to controlling China's most developed agricultural area.

After Japan's victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, its first priority was to vigorously promote the development of Japanese shipping companies in the Yangtze River basin. Because the Japanese had the most in-depth understanding of British politics and economics, they immediately saw the benefits of controlling the Yangtze River shipping industry for Japanese industry and commerce. This was also an important reason why Japanese shipping companies received state support in the Yangtze River shipping industry.

The emergence of the Wuhan regime essentially cut off the direct outflow of surplus agricultural products from the middle and upper reaches of the Yangtze River. Through primary industrial processing, it broke free from the old China's low-level trade relationship of simply exporting raw grains and exchanged this industrial added value with German industrial products. This is why British merchants had to abandon their hardline stance against the Wuhan regime.

Unable to force the Wuhan regime to return to the old Anglo-Sino-Chinese trade relations through force, the British government had to consider making concessions to the Wuhan regime to prevent the market in central China from being occupied by Germany and the United States. In fact, given the capabilities demonstrated by the Wuhan regime in foreign wars, its influence in China expanded very rapidly. Therefore, the great powers believed that the Wuhan regime would eventually control China. Thus, the British were no longer concerned about losing the market in central China, but rather about losing the entire Chinese market.

Yoshida Shigeru also believed that the assessments of foreign diplomats were reasonable. Even before witnessing the regime firsthand in Wuhan, Wuhan's influence on the Chinese political stage was growing. Yuan Shikai, a powerful figure in China praised by foreign diplomats, was widely believed to be capable of stabilizing social order in northern China. However, no one thought he could resolve the Wuhan regime's problems. After all, the Beiyang Army's performance in the war against Russia was far inferior to that of the Wuhan army. Even within the Beiyang Army itself, discussions about the Wuhan army were evasive, lacking any provocative pronouncements.

The East Asian War of 1908 was essentially over. If we do not consider China as a single power, then Japan occupied the Korean Peninsula and coastal areas on the East Asian mainland; the Beiyang clique occupied South Manchuria, North China, and Northwest China; Wuhan controlled North Manchuria, Outer Northeast, Outer Baikal, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Jiangxi, Huguang, Sichuan, Guizhou, Tibet, and Shannan; several forces coexisted in the Yangtze River region; Guangdong was jointly governed by the Tongmenghui and former Qing officials; and Guangxi, Yunnan, Xinjiang, and other places nominally supported the central government but were in reality divided by local forces.

The reason why Outer Manchuria and the Transbaikal region were considered Wuhan's territory was that, although the Chita regime claimed to be part of Russia, it refused to pledge allegiance to the Tsar because the Tsar had betrayed the people. The reason why the Chita regime openly confronted St. Petersburg was because it had the support of the Wuhan regime.

A glance at the overall situation in East Asia reveals that only three forces truly vie for continental dominance: Japan, Wuhan, and the Beiyang government. Others had no chance of entering the fray, and Russian influence had already temporarily withdrawn from the region. However, Japan, not being part of China, lacked a legitimate claim to dominance in East Asia, making it a target for all. Therefore, the truly qualified contenders for dominance in East Asia were Wuhan and Yuan Shikai; other nations were merely hedging their bets on these two.

However, without intervention from other countries, the Beiyang government simply lacked the capacity to confront Wuhan, as its power was effectively divided in two by Wuhan's territory, with the Northwest region disconnected from North China and South Manchuria. In ancient China, leveraging its geographical advantage, the Beiyang clique could have launched a coordinated east-west offensive, driving the Wuhan regime, hampered by poor north-south transportation, out of the north.

However, the advent of railways and automobiles solved the problem of north-south transportation for the Wuhan regime. The Beijing-Hankou Railway, a major artery connecting north and south China, was almost entirely controlled by Wuhan. The Beiyang government only controlled the railway section north of Shijiazhuang, while the construction rights for the Qinhuangdao-Yuzhou-Haikou Railway, connecting east and west, were also in Wuhan's hands.

After three years of hard work, the Luotong Railway was finally completed in June this year. The 1760-meter-long Xiashiyi Tunnel is the first high-difficulty construction project that the Chinese have independently completed. The No. 8 Bridge, which connects Huaigou Tunnel in the east and Xiashi Tunnel in the west, is a 45-meter-high and 172.5-meter-long iron bridge. The prefabricated components of this bridge were all produced in Wuhan, which greatly shortened the construction period.

The completion of the Luoyang-Tongguan Railway represented a new stage in the development of China's engineering technology and industrial capabilities. The Songhua River Railway Bridge on the Eastern Qing Railway, which also took three years to build from 1898 to 1901, had its components sourced from Poland. These two bridges were built less than ten years apart, yet they demonstrated that the Chinese were already capable of forging large steel components.

Japanese engineers spoke highly of the Luoyang-Tongguan Railway, believing that the Chinese not only fulfilled the design intent well, but also achieved excellent engineering quality. Judging from the engineering capabilities of this railway alone, the Chinese had mastered the design and construction of complex projects, and had also reached European standards in the manufacture of steel components.

Behind this assessment lies the fact that some Japanese people who study science and engineering have revised their impression of China as ignorant and backward, believing that China, like Japan, is now catching up with advanced European technology, instead of lying stagnant and pretending to be dead as before.

A China willing to develop should not be treated as prey. However, this view was not shared by Japan's upper-class elites. After all, Japan's top figures studied Western law and politics, second-tier figures studied military science, and only third-tier figures studied science and engineering. Japan's future was in the hands of elites like Shigeru Yoshida, but Yoshida, who was well-versed in both Chinese and Western learning, did not believe that technology could change China. He believed that politics and law were the source of national wealth and military strength.

Therefore, Yoshida Shigeru's first reaction to China's technological and industrial advancements was not to cooperate with the Chinese, but rather to consider how to restrict their development. This intellectual mindset led to his failure to gain the approval of the Chinese representatives during negotiations, and even in trilateral talks between Japan, China, and India, the Chinese and Indian representatives seemed intent on excluding Japan from the decision-making process.

Yoshida Shigeru did not believe that this was caused by his own negotiation style. Instead, he believed that it was a conspiracy by the Chinese and Indians against Japan. He once suggested that Matsukata Kojiro should take a tough stance in business negotiations to establish Japan's leading position in the three countries. After all, if the three countries cooperated, Japan would take on important financing business.

However, Matsukata Kojiro remained noncommittal about Yoshida Shigeru's suggestion, completely ignoring Yoshida's claim that China's rapid development would become a future threat to Japan. He wanted his current ministerial position; as for the future Japan-China issue, that was for future ministers to consider. Yoshida Shigeru was just a young man who had just entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it was far too early for him to be thinking about such matters. It would be more believable if Makino had said such things to him, but he wouldn't sacrifice his own interests for it. Was Japan's future really as important as his own?

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Yoshida Shigeru was also greatly disappointed with Matsukata Kojiro's character. In his eyes, Matsukata Kojiro, as the son of Matsukata Genro, was part of the ruling class of Japan and should naturally put the interests of the country first. However, Matsukata Kojiro was clearly more concerned about his personal future than about the future of the country.

Although Yoshida Shigeru was a beneficiary of the Meiji Restoration, he did not consider himself qualified to call himself part of the ruling class. Only the Choshu-Satsuma clan and those close to the Emperor were qualified to call themselves part of Japan's ruling class, such as his father-in-law.

Yoshida believed that his father-in-law, Makino Nobuaki's, strong political ambition was what the ruling class of the country should look like. He was willing to marry Makino Nobuaki's daughter in the hope of becoming a member of the ruling class. If he did not have such a strong ambition, he would actually be more comfortable not marrying Makino's daughter, given his wealth.

The old aristocratic families usually chose to marry into the imperial family and other old aristocratic families. After the establishment of the Meiji Restoration government, the previously impoverished nobles of Kyoto suddenly began to value their social standing. They no longer married off their daughters casually as before, but tried to maintain their aristocratic status through marriage. For example, Count Yanagihara Sakimitsu married his daughter to the mentally challenged Viscount Kitakōji Suikō, which was based on this mentality.

Meanwhile, the newly rich and powerful attempted to use marriage to absorb poor but talented young people, so that these young people could inherit their political resources and thus maintain the family's power. This kind of marriage seemed to be an opportunity for poor but talented young people to rise above their circumstances, but in reality, it turned these talented young people into political henchmen for the newly rich families, and their talents were tied to the political stance of the newly rich families.

With the inheritance he received, Yoshida Shigeru had no need to tie himself to any newly wealthy family. He could simply work diligently at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and his wealth would allow him to rise to prominence on his own. Now that he was the son-in-law of the Makino family, he was politically constrained. In reality, the Makino family couldn't offer him many resources, since Makino Nobuaki wasn't yet in charge of the Satsuma clique, and he hadn't even realized his own political ambitions.

However, Yoshida admired his father-in-law's political ambitions, which is why he accepted this marriage, which was not a good deal for him. In a sense, Yoshida Shigeru was not marrying into the Makino family, but rather into Makino Nobuaki himself, forming a political alliance through the relationship between father-in-law and son-in-law.

Although Makino was a rising star among the Okubo faction, he did not support clan politics. He advocated that Japanese politics should emulate British politics, meaning that for the sake of Japan's future, both clan politics and the elder statesman system should be abolished. Yoshida Shigeru supported his father-in-law's view, which was the basis for his belief that both he and his father-in-law prioritized national interests over personal ones. After all, for the sake of the nation's future, could there be a more selfless decision than Makino Nobuaki, a member of a clan, advocating for the abolition of clan politics?

However, Matsukata Kojiro and Makino Nobuaki were two different kinds of people. He almost never mentioned the future of Japan, but only cared about what benefits this matter would bring to Kawasaki Shipbuilding, or would often use Hayashi Nobuyoshi's words to shut Yoshida Shigeru up. This self-interested style was naturally difficult for Yoshida Shigeru to agree with, especially since Matsukata was a member of the national ruling class and naturally enjoyed more rights than others.

Yoshida Shigeru's annoyance with Matsukata Kojiro stemmed from the fact that he felt he was working for the other party's benefit and didn't believe he had the same rights as his father-in-law and Matsukata. However, Matsukata Kojiro not only didn't appreciate it but also constantly undermined him. As for another member of the negotiation team, Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi Nobuyoshi, Yoshida also harbored considerable resentment towards him, but it was a feeling he couldn't quite put into words.

One of his major tasks on this trip was to observe Lin Xinyi's influence in China, but frankly, he had no way of observing his movements at all, because the Chinese treated Lin Xinyi in a completely different way than they treated them.

The Chinese treated them like VIPs, keeping them in Wuhan's newest hotels. The hotels were not only elegant, but also fully equipped with water, electricity, refrigerators, and private bathrooms. The facilities were very modern, and although not as luxurious as the Imperial Hotel, there were no inconveniences.

As for Lin Hsin-yi, upon arriving in Wuhan, he was invited to stay in the residential area of ​​Tian Junyi and other high-ranking members of the Labor Party, near Guishan in Hanyang. It is said to be next to Tian Junyi's residence. It is said that Yoshida Shigeru was not qualified to be invited to Tian Junyi's private banquet, but Matsukata Kojiro and Lin Hsin-yi and his wife attended together.

During the negotiations, Lin Xinyi only attended the first meeting and delivered a speech on the importance of trilateral cooperation, and then did not participate again. Therefore, observing Lin Xinyi's whereabouts in China was the most difficult task for Yoshida Shigeru, but he was always aware of Lin Xinyi's influence in the Wuhan regime.

Lin Xinyi was not only allowed to bring people to private banquets hosted by the top leader in Wuhan at will, which made Matsukata Kojiro constantly talk about his friendliness towards the Chinese people. He could even set the tone for the negotiations, and no matter how intense the arguments were with the Chinese or Indian representatives, they never considered interrupting the negotiations.

Therefore, Hayashi Shin-yi's idea is a mystery to Yoshida Shigeru. The foundation he laid for the trilateral cooperation is an undeniable achievement, but he did not translate his influence over China and India into substantial concessions to Japan. Yoshida Shigeru believes that Hayashi Shin-yi could have done so if he really wanted to.

For Shigeru Yoshida, Hayashi Nobuyoshi was neither a member of the ruling class like his father-in-law and himself, who constantly talked about the nation, nor was he a selfish person like Matsukata Kojiro who put personal interests before the nation. He was simply an unpredictable individual. But Yoshida also had to admit the fact that only Hayashi Nobuyoshi could keep Matsukata Kojiro in check; he himself did not have that ability.

The only problem was that Lin Xinyi didn't show up at the hotel or the negotiation meetings at all; he seemed to really treat this trip to China as a honeymoon. Yoshida Shigeru wanted to have a proper talk with him, but he couldn't.

While Yoshida harbored resentment towards Lin Xinyi, Lin Xinyi was indeed traveling and enjoying himself. He retraced his route to Chengdu, making visits and observations along the way, comparing it with his earlier expedition to Tibet. Just as Yoshida was vehemently complaining about him, Lin Xinyi had returned to the Hanyang Wharf.

Upon hearing of his return, Tian Junyi immediately invited him to dinner. After the meal, Madam Tian took Lin Muzi to the living room to talk. Muzi had already begun learning Chinese, and although she wasn't as fluent as Lin Xinyi, she could still manage basic conversations. Meanwhile, Tian Junyi and Lin Xinyi went to the study to converse.

When Tian Junyi asked Lin Xinyi about his impressions of the trip to Sichuan, Lin Xinyi bluntly said: "Compared with a few years ago, there is less opium cultivation and fewer drug addicts in Sichuan. The laborers seem to be a little richer. Compared with the Qing Dynasty, this is undoubtedly a very good change. However, this economic change is not entirely a good thing for the proletarian regime."

Tian Junyi was quite surprised by Lin Xinyi's words. He knew that Lin Xinyi could tell him the truth, which was why he invited him to talk about his experiences as soon as possible. He had even prepared himself for the possibility that there would be serious problems. However, he really did not expect Lin Xinyi to criticize the changes in Sichuan by talking about the improvement of the economy, which made him a little confused.

Tian Junyi then frankly stated: "I don't quite understand what you're saying. You say that Sichuan's socio-economic situation is better than it was during the Qing Dynasty. Why is this a bad thing for the proletarian regime? Isn't the practice of socialism precisely about developing productive forces?"

Lin Xinyi nodded and then shook his head, saying, "The development of productive forces in socialist practice is based on the fact that labor creates social wealth, and is the only way to create social wealth."

According to socialist theory, the social relations of production that hinder human labor are essentially the private ownership of the means of production. Because of the private ownership of the means of production, people with the ability to work are unable to create social wealth through labor, thereby failing to promote social progress.

After China entered a mature agricultural era, almost no feudal dynasty lasted more than three hundred years. Each dynasty attributed its downfall to land annexation. However, fundamentally, land annexation was not the root cause of dynastic collapse. The Industrial Revolution in Britain was a period of intense land annexation, to the point that the British described it as a time of "sheep eating men," as landowners converted vast tracts of public land into private property for grazing their flocks.

Why did land annexation occur in both China and Britain, but in China it led to dynastic changes, while in Britain it propelled the Industrial Revolution? I believe the difference lies in the fact that land annexation in China created a large number of unproductive displaced people, while Britain provided these displaced farmers with a way to earn a living by transferring them to colonies and urban factories.

Sichuan's current economic improvement is based on land reform, which involved the proletarian regime using force to redistribute land from landlords to landless peasants. These peasants, now qualified to work, were able to create wealth on their private land, and naturally, they felt their lives were improving. This view wasn't limited to peasants; many social elites also shared it.

However, for the proletariat, this economic prosperity is nothing more than a false prosperity in the early days of a dynasty, because small producers can only work on private land. Once they lose this small piece of private land, they immediately become landless peasants and are once again excluded from the social relations of production.

With the development of technology, a strong laborer can only cultivate about five mu (approximately 0.2 acres) by manual labor; with animal power, a laborer can cultivate a maximum of 20 mu (approximately 3.3 acres); and with tractors, a laborer can cultivate 400 mu (approximately 66 acres). In other words, with the development of technology, the area of ​​land that one person can cultivate is constantly expanding, but the population in peacetime is constantly growing, meaning that the amount of arable land per capita will only decrease.

Therefore, the prosperity created by Sichuan's current system of small-scale private land ownership will soon crumble over time. If the proletarian regime accepts the views of these small producers and social elites, believing that non-interference in peasant production and allowing peasants to freely produce and labor on their own land will usher in a new golden age, then I must say that such a golden age will not appear in a materialistic world. The degeneration of the proletarian regime is certain, because the mutual devouring of small producers will inevitably lead them to seek the support of the state apparatus, and the corruption of the regime is an inevitable choice for small producers.

Tian Junyi suddenly felt a dampness on his back. He hadn't felt this apprehensive in a long time. After all, after finding the right revolutionary path, he saw the Labor Party growing stronger day by day, and the country's environment was slowly improving. In the past, the most famous goods at the Wuhan docks were tea, but after the First Sino-Japanese War, opium became a major commodity, subtly overshadowing the tea business.

A large portion of the tea trade was foreign trade, which could bring in external funds for the country. However, the opium trade was almost entirely for domestic consumption, absorbing the surplus money of rural and urban families without creating any value. The expansion of the opium trade actually meant that funds in rural areas flowed from the production end to the consumption end, making already capital-scarce rural areas even poorer.

The Qing Dynasty's more than 200 years of isolationism left most of its people ignorant. Even the upper-class social elites were unclear about which country the Opium War was actually fought against. However, this ignorance was caused by ideological confinement rather than racial issues. Therefore, soon after the country opened its doors, insightful people realized the harmfulness of the ever-expanding opium trade.

The decline of the tea trade at Hankou Wharf and the rise of domestic opium trade over imported opium reflected the rapid decline of the rural economy. Farmers, increasingly addicted to opium, were gradually losing their right and ability to work. While the elites of the Qing Dynasty understood this fact, they were unable to devise a viable solution to the opium ban.

The forced destruction of opium drew intervention from foreign powers, who restricted its cultivation and sale through taxation. However, this led local governments to protect opium cultivation as a source of local revenue. After the Boxer Rebellion, opium became almost a daily necessity for ordinary people, and opium stalls could be found even in the most remote towns and villages.

Only after the establishment of the Wuhan regime did the area under opium cultivation and the scale of the opium trade begin to decline rapidly. This was not only a major achievement of the Wuhan regime, but also acknowledged by many landlords who opposed the Workers' Party, who believed that the Wuhan regime truly possessed the characteristics of a ruler. Some of those landlords who opposed land reform did not oppose the rule of the Wuhan regime, because they believed that such a strong government was necessary for contemporary China.

After assuming the presidency of the State Council, Yuan Shikai did consider implementing a similar anti-opium policy to that in Wuhan within the Beiyang government's territory. Yuan himself was a social elite who vehemently opposed opium use, and opium smoking was a serious crime within the Beiyang Army. However, his ideas did not receive support from the Beiyang clique and northern gentry. A major reason was that opium tax was an indispensable financial pillar for the Beiyang clique, and local officials generally resisted a policy of completely banning the opium trade, stating that once the opium trade was prohibited, local finances would be in trouble unless the central government provided financial subsidies.

Yuan Shikai initially attempted to use political maneuvering to force local officials to accept his orders. After all, the fact that the Beiyang government, as the central government, lagged behind the Wuhan regime on the issue of opium prohibition had already challenged the legitimacy of the Beijing government's rule. Since the Opium War marked the beginning of the opening of China's doors to foreign powers, the issue of opium prohibition was essentially equated with opposition to foreign invasion in the minds of the people.

A government that dares not ban the opium trade is essentially no different from the Qing Dynasty, especially with the Wuhan regime as a point of reference, Beijing has always faced immense pressure. Yuan Shikai was confident that his political skills were no less than those of the people in Wuhan, and this was not just his personal feeling; many Chinese and foreign elites had said the same. Many policies implemented in Wuhan were uncompromising, such as promoting land reform, abolishing extraterritoriality, and abolishing the navigation rights of foreign warships on the Yangtze River. This uncompromising approach earned the Wuhan regime many enemies.

Whether they were local scholar-officials or elites who had returned from studying abroad, they all criticized the Wuhan regime for its brute force in domestic and foreign affairs. They argued that it lacked both traditional Chinese benevolent rule and foreign democratic politics, which was why Wuhan was so unstable. Local armed rebellions against Wuhan's rule occurred almost every year, but they were all suppressed by Wuhan's powerful military force.

In contrast, the Beiyang clique led by Yuan Shikai, having received the legacy of the abdication of the Qing dynasty, faced virtually no opposition at the local level. Even many Qing officials who had initially been loyal to the Qing and opposed Yuan Shikai pragmatically accepted Yuan's rule after the abdication edict was issued. For example, when Yang Shixiang took office as Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu, Emperor Guangxu had not yet abdicated, but the Manchu governor-general, who opposed Han Chinese rule, did not resist Yang Shixiang's appointment, and the Shaanxi and Gansu local authorities did not refuse to recognize Yang Shixiang's appointment as illegitimate in order to continue protecting the Qing dynasty.